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Schmid: Immigration Law

IMMIGRATION LAW
I.

A.

ELIGIBILITY FOR LABOR CERTIFICATION:
REQUISITE INTENT TO ENGAGE IN THE
CERTIFIED EMPLOYMENT
INTRODUCTION

In Yui Sing Tse v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, I
the Ninth Circuit considered the issue of how long an alien must
intend, at time of entry, to engage in the employment for which
he was certified in order to qualify for a labor category immigrant
visa.
Petitioner was admitted to the United States on a student
visa in January, 1971. In March, 1973, the Department of Labor
issued petitioner an alien employment certification pursuant to
section 1182(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the
Act) authorizing petitioner's employment as a Chinese specialty
cook. 2 Petitioner then applied for adjustment of status under section 12553 of the Act claiming entitlement to a "sixth preference"
1. 596 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Browning, J.; the other panel members were
Wallace, J. and Waters, D.J.) (Judge Wallace dissented and filed an opinion).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1978) provides that aliens seeking to enter the United
States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor are ineligible to receive visas
and are excludable
unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to
the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (A)
there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are
able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of application
for a visa and admission to the United States ... and (B) the
employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages
and working conditions of the workers in the United States
similarly employed . . . .
The visa represents permission to enter and stay in the United States. The labor certification, on the other hand, is a preliminary requirement for the issuance of certain visas. It
is generally required of visa applicants whose primary purpose is the performance of labor
and who do not qualify for immigration on the basis of relatives in the United States. See
generally 1 C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE §§ 2.40, 3.6
(1978).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1978) provides in relevant part:
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney
General, in his discretion and under such regulation as he may
proscribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and
is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and

295
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980

1

296

Golden Gate
University
Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss.
1 [1980],REVIEW
Art. 11
GOLDEN
GATE
UNIVERSITY
LAW

[Vol. 10:295

visa under section 1153(a)(6).4
Petitioner's application for adjustment of status was denied
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted deportation proceedings. In the course of these proceedings petitioner requested reconsideration of his application for adjustment
of status. At a hearing held in July, 1975, petitioner disclosed that
he had been accepted for admission to dental school. He testified
that it would require four years to complete his dental education,
and that he intended to continue working as a Chinese specialty
cook to support himself while attending school. 5
The immigration judge denied petitioner's application and
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The BIA
looked to whether, at the moment of entry, the alien intended to
change from the certified employment. On the basis of this standard, the BIA concluded that as a matter of law petitioner was
ineligible for the preference status since his intent was not to
continue as a cook, but rather to become a dentist. 6 On appeal
the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA standard, reversed and remanded the case.
(3) immigrant visa is immediately available to him at the time
his application is filed.
In essence, adjustment of status is a procedure whereby an alien, already present in the
United States in a temporary or irregular status, may apply for a permanent residence
visa while remaining in the country. Before enactment of § 1255 the alien had to leave
the United States, obtain the visa abroad, and return. See generally 2 C. GORDON AND H.
ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at § 7.7. Although the applicant for adjustment of status is
already in the United States, he will be regarded as an alien seeking entry for purposes of
determining his eligibility for the permanent residence visa. Hamid v. Immigration & Nat.
Serv., 538 F.2d 1389,1390 (9th Cir. 1976); Talanoa v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 397 F.2d
196, 200 (9th Cir. 1976).
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1978) provides that visas will be provided to otherwise
qualified persons "who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not
of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which a shortage of employable and willing persons
exist in the United States. . . ."
There are seven preference categories which allot a limited number of immigrant
(permanent resident) visas to aliens seeking entry to the United States. For a discussion
of the preference system see generally 1 C. GORDON AND H. RoSENFEW, supra note 2, at
§§ 2.25-.28.
5. 596 F.2d at 833.
6. The BIA did not consider the ground on which the immigration judge based his
decision. The immigration judge found petitioner ineligible since, at the time of petitioner's request for reconsideration of his application, he was employed by a different
employer than the one designated on the labor certificate. The Ninth Circuit declined to
consider this issue since the BIA did not rely on it. [d. at 833 n.3.
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BACKGROUND

Section 1153(a)(6) of the Act provides a limited number of
"sixth preference" visas to aliens seeking permanent residence in
the United States. 7 In order to be eligible, the applicant must be
qualified to perform services which are not of a seasonal or temporary natureS and for which there exists a shortage of employable
workers in this country. As a condition to eligibility for the "sixth
preference" visa, the alien must apply for and receive a certification from the Department of Labor acknowledging that the labor
which the alien intends to perform will not displace American
workers or advesely affect their wages or working conditions. u
The Federal Regulations require the invalidation of any visa
application where there is found any "change in the respective
intentions of the prospective employer and the beneficiary (the
alien) that the beneficiary will be employed by the employer in
the capacity indicated in the supporting job offer."10 Nothing in
the language of the regulations, however, expressly indicates the
length of time the alien must intend to occupy the position for
which he was certified.
C.

THE

NEW BALANCING STANDARD

The specific question presented to the court m Tse was
7. For the relevant statutory language, see note 4 supra.
8. Few decisions have definitively spoken to the question of what is or is not temporary or seasonal work. The BIA has considered two factors: 1) whether the nature of the
work itself is permanent, Matter of Smith, 12 1. & N. Dec. 772 (1968) (employment by a
firm which provides temporary office personnel to other companies not temporary since
employing firm pays workers directly and employment was full-time and permanent); cf.
Matter of Contopoulos, 101. & N. Dec. 654 (1964) (employment as a "governess, mother's
helper" permanent since duties last as long as family unit exists); Matter of L-, 8 1. &
N. Dec. 460 (1960) (position of intern at hospital found permanent); and 2) whether the
employer intends to employ the alien permanently, Matter of lzdebska, 121. & N. Dec.
54 (1964) (employment temporary since in light of past practice, the employer failed to
prove his intent to employ the alien permanently).
9. In discharging his responsibilities the Secretary of Labor has established two
"schedules" listing occupations for which individual determinations need not be made.
The first, "Schedule A," is a blanket determination that the entry of an alien in the
occupations it enumerates will not adversely affect the American labor market. The second, "Schedule B," is a non certification list or the blanket determination that there is an
ample supply of American workers to fill the occupations it enumerates. Certification of
jobs not listed on either schedule is made on an individual basis. For a discussion of the
certification procedure see generally 1A C. GORDON AND H. ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at §
3.6.
10. 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(b) (1979).
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whether or not the BIA applied the appropriate legal standard in
determining petitioner's eligibility for a "sixth preference" visa.
The Majority

The majority first addressed two interests it deemed worthy
of protection in considering the appropriate standard to apply,
the first being the protection of American labor.lI According to
the court, the "sixth preference" visa was designed to permit the
entry of aliens capable of performing labor for which American
workers were not available. The labor certification attempts to
assure the protection of American workers from the competition
of aliens who might otherwise take jobs Americans could fill. It
The majority next considered what it found to be a "second
and potentially conflicting interest of an alien granted permanent
resident status in the opportunity to earn a living"13 and to improve his economic circumstances without undue limitation or
discrimination. The court felt that undue restriction on a permanent resident's freedom to change occupations could raise serious
constitutional problems. U
The standard applied by the BIA was then examined in the
context of the two "protected interests". The BIA standard-which in effect requires the applicant to intend to occupy
the certified position indefinitely-was found to be too narrow
and rigid to accommodate the interests to be protected. The court
held that "sixth preference" applicants need not intend to occupy
the certified employment forever, but only for a "period of time
that is reasonable in light both of the interest served by the statute and the interest in freedom to change employment."15 Thus,
11. 596 F.2d at 834.
12. [d. It is clear that the purpose of the labor certification is to exclude aliens who

could otherwise compete for jobs American workers could fill. See S. REp. No. 748, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 3328, 3333.
13. 596 F.2d at 834.
14. As authority for the "second interest" the court cited 1 & 1A C. GORDON AND H.
ROSENFELD, supra note 2, at §§ 1.34, 3.6g; 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(0 (1976), and Castaneda·
Gonzalez V. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 564 F.2d 417, 433 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1977). As the
dissent points out, all of the above authority refers only to a permanent resident's right
to pursue employment. There is no indication that the rights of resident aliens extend as
well to aliens of another status. In fact, th~ section of C. GORDON AND H. RoSENFELD cited
in the majority opinion expressly states that illegal and nonimmigrant (i. e., non·
permanent resident) aliens have no right to work in this country. See C. GORDON AND H.
ROSENFELD supra note 2, at § 1.34A.
15. 596 F.2d at 835.
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the court concluded that application of this standard to the facts
of the case indicated that petitioner's intent to occupy the certified employment for a period of four years (while attending dental
school) and to change employment only upon a condition that
might not be satisfied (successful completion of dental school),
was entirely reasonable in light of the interests to be protected. lfl
After examining the relevant statutory sections and regulation, which the court found not to be supportive of the BIA's
position, 17 the court considered the two cases cited by the BIA as
authority for its standard, and found both decisions distinguishable on their facts. IS
As a result of its new balancing standard, the majority thus
concluded that petitioner was eligible for adjustment of status. A
petition for adjustment of status, however, calls for two determinations: whether the applicant is eligible for relief; and, if so,
whether relief should be granted as a matter of discretion. Since
the second determination was never made, the majority remanded the case for further proceedings. IS

The Dissent
Judge Wallace focused his dissent on the analytical foundation of the majority opinion, the two "protected interests." Although agreeing that the policy behind the grant of "sixth preference" status was the protection of American labor, he found the
majority far astray in its attempt to apply the "second and poten16. [d.
17. [d. The majority pointed out that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) does not
bear on the length of commitment required. Likewise, 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(b), on its face, only
requires that applicants intend to be employed in the job, not that they intend to remain
in the job forever. The court also found that 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) which limits "sixth
preference" visas to persons capable of performing labor "not of a temporary or seasonal
nature" was not dispositive since the reference is only to the nature of the employment
itself, not to the intent of the applicant.
It is interesting to note that in determining the temporary or permanent nature of
employment the BIA has looked to the intent of the employer. See note 8 supra. If the
intent of the employer is relevant to the determination of the nature of the employment,
it is unclear why the intent of the applicant would be any less relevant.
18. 596 F.2d at 835. The court found that the petitioner in Matter of La Pietra, 13 I.
& N. Dec. 11 (1964), did not possess the skills on which the certification was based.
Likewise, Matter of Kim, 13 I. & N. Dec. 16 (1968) was distinguishable in that the
petitioner never occupied the certified position and had no intention of doing so at any
time in the future.
19. 596 F.2d at 835-36.
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tially conflicting interest. "20
The dissent first attacked the scant authority relied upon for
that second interest. All of the majority's authority reciting the
principle of "freedom to work" referred only to the rights of properly admitted permanent residents, not to aliens seeking admission. 21
The dissent also found the majority misleading in its approach to the issue and its understanding of the BIA standard.
The dissent stated that the issue was not whether an alien, once
properly admitted for permanent residence, may change jobs.
Rather, "the question is whether an alien who applies for immigrant status . . . may definitively intend, at the time that he
makes his application, to change employment from that for which
he acquired his labor certificate."22
The BIA did not forbid an immigrant alien from improving
his employment situation, the dissent pointed out. The BIA simply held that when the petitioning alien submits his application
he must have made the choice to work in the area for which he
received the work certificate. The dissent concluded that when
the petitioner admitted that his desire to work in the certified
employment was merely temporary, i.e., until he became a dentist, he should not qualify. 23
The dissent found the BIA principle illustrated in Matter of
Poulin.24 In Poulin, the alien worked in the certified employment
for only one day after which he began working in uncertified
employment. At the exclusion hearing, the alien admitted that he
intended, at time of entry, to work in the certified position only
until his papers were finalized. The BIA upheld the alien's exclusion on the grounds that he "actually intended" to work in the
uncertified job. The dissent found the underlying principle of
20. ld. at 836.
21. ld. The dissent also pointed out that 29 C.F.R. § 60.5(f) (1976), relied upon by
the majority for the "second interest," had been repealed. The regulation provided in
relevant part that "the terms and conditions of the labor certificate shall not be construed
as preventing an immigrant properly admitted to the United States from subsequently
changing jobs . . . . " The new regulations do not contain comparable language. See 20
C.F.R. § 656 (1979).
22. 596 F.2d at 837.
23. Id.
24. 13 I. & N. Dec. 264 (1968).
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Poulin equally applicable to the facts in Tse. Although the petitioner in Tse intended to work for four years rather than one day,
in both cases the intent was, for the foreseeable future, not to
work in the certified job, but to work in that job only until another
uncertified job became available. 25 The dissent concluded that
the majority's holding would only frustrate the statutory mandate of protecting American labor. 26
D.

CRITIQUE

As pointed out by the dissent, the primary weakness of the
majority decision lies in the "second interest," the probable constitutional right of permanent residents to earn a livelihood. It is
not clear from the majority's reasoning which alien status is
vested of this right. Did the court understand the right to belong
solely to aliens properly admitted for permanent residence?27 Or
did the majority view the right to earn a living as equally applicable to petitioner, an alien seeking admission to the United
States?28
If the majority found the "second interest" solely in a perma-

nent resident's right to earn a livelihood, it did not est~blish how
the BIA standard failed to accommodate a permanent resident's
right. It would appear that the majority misunderstood the BIA
standard which only holds that an alien seeking admission to the
United States for the purpose of performing labor must intend,
at time of entry, to indefinitely occupy the certified position. The
BIA has never held that an alien once admitted for permanent
residence must occupy the certified employment forever. Once
25. 596 F.2d at 837.
26. [d.
27. The majority framed the "second interest" solely in terms of permanent resident's
rights. "The second and potentially conflicting interest of an alien granted permanent
residence status is the opportunity to earn a living . . . . " [d. at 834 (emphasis added).
There is no express indication in the body of the majority decision of its intention to
extend this "right" to aliens seeking admission.
28. That the majority intended to extend the right to earn a livelihood to non-resident
aliens may be evidenced by its discussion of the decision of the immigration judge in
footnote 3 of the majority opinion. The immigration judge denied petitioner's application
on the ground that petitioner, at that time a non-immigrant student, had changed from
the job for which he had been certified. The majority approved the BIA's failure to rely
on this ground. "Board rulings in analogous circumstances cast doubt upon the validity
of the immigration judge's ruling . . . . " [d. at 833 n.3 (emphasis added). The two
rulings referred to by the court, however, dealt solely with the permanent resident's
freedom to change occupations. See Matter of Cardoso, 131. & N. Dec. 228 (1969); Matter
of Klein, 12 1. & N. Dec. 819 (1968).
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properly admitted, a permanent resident is free to change his
mind and seek different employment. 29
On the other hand, if a permanent resident's right to work
was intended by the court to apply, by analogy, to aliens seeking
admission, the court is embarking upon a novel and unprecedented territory. It is well established that aliens have no constitutional right to enter the United States. so In this light, it seems
incongruous to imply that an alien seeking admission, who has no
right even to enter this country, would have a constitutionally
protected right to work here. 31

E.

CONCLUSION

The significance of Tse rests more on its ambiguous reasoning than on its holding. Whether Tse represents the Ninth Circuit's misunderstanding of the BIA standard, its confusion of the
rights of permanent residents with those of aliens seeking admission, or the court's willingness to extend the constitutional right
to work to aliens seeking admission, remains to be seen.
Whatever may be the underlying reason for the court's stand
in Tse, it is unlikely that the ruling will have a substantial deleterious impact on American labor. The number of aliens entering
the United States on the basis of labor certifications is insignificant compared to the numbers in the American workforce. 32 In
29. Matter of Cardoso, 13 I. & N. Dec. 228 (1969) (alien's post-entry failure to continue in the certified employment may give rise to a suspicion that he never intended to
fulfill his employment contract; however, if the alien has been admitted for permanent
residence with the. good faith intention of occupying the job, he is free to pursue other
employment); Matter of Marcoux, 12 I. & N. Dec. 827 (1968) (permanent resident may
leave certified job after short time because of dissatisfaction with working conditions or
wages); Matter of Klein, 12 I. & N. Dec. 819 (1968) (permanent resident not deportable
simply because the certified job was no longer available).
30. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the power of Congress to determine
which aliens may enter the United States is plenary and unqualified. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
31. Only one court has faced the issue extending the constitutional right to work to
aliens other than permanent residents. In Pilapil v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 424 F.2d 6
(lOth Cir. 1970), the Tenth Circuit discussed the constitutional status of an alien seeking
admission and concluded that an alien seeking admission has "no rights under the Constitution, laws or government of the United States. As a citizen and national of another
country his rights were established by the alien law peculiar to his native domicile. . . .
Therefore, no rights under the Constitution. . . relative to equal opportunity of employment are involved." [d. at 11.
32. In 1975, 15,087 "third" and "sixth preference" aliens were admitted for perm a-
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tum, the court's ruling affects only a small percentage of those
aliens, those who admit by words or acts their intention to change
from the certified employment. Moreover, the court's standard,
in terms of the "first interest," recognizes the statutory duty to
protect American labor. It is doubtful that the court, in future
cases, will substantially frustrate the purpose for the labor certification.
Nevertheless, the court leaves us to merely speculate as to
the possible results of future application of its new standard.
Which of the two factors (Le., length of commitment or uncertainty of change) will be the most dispositive in future
considerations? Would a commitment to work in the certified job
for two years and to change only upon the fulfillment of an uncertain condition be reasonable? Would a longer commitment be
reasonable if the change were certain to occur? And will the court
consider other factors, such as the nature of the future
employment? If the future employment is presently one for which
certifications are available, will the balance more likely tip in
favor of the alien?
The implications of the new standard are certainly vague but
will hopefully be clarified in later decisions. In the meantime the
practitioner should be cautious of relying on Tse. Its ambiguous
reasoning is conducive to several interpretations and it is easily
distinguishable on its facts. At this point, it is only clear that the
intent to work in certified employment for four years and to
change from that employment only upon a condition that may
not be satisfied (successful completion of dental school) will be
deemed reasonable by this court.
. Alex Schmid

ll. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION: A NEW APPROACH
TO THE CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE
REQUIREMENT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Kamheangpatiyooth u. Immigration and Naturalization
nent residence. (1976) INS ANN. REP. 45 (1976). The total number of persons in the
American civilian lab~r force for that year was 92,613,000. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 9 (Sept. 1979).
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Service, I the Ninth Circuit re-examined the standard applied to
determine the "continuous physical presence" requirement for
eligibility for suspension of deportation relief.

Petitioner was legally admitted to the United States as a
student in 1964. In 1970, petitioner returned to Thailand during
a semester vacation to visit his mother who was gravely ill. He
left the United States on December 10, 1970, and returned on
January 10, 1971. Before :leaving on his trip, petitioner obtained
an Immigration Form 1-20N which he used in Bangkok to obtain
a new student visa. This thirty-day visit to his mother was petitioner's only absence from the United States during the twelveyear period from his initial entry in 1964 until his application for
suspension of deportation in 1976. 3
Petitioner's authorization to remain in this country expired
on January 23, 1976. When he did not depart, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings. Petitioner admitted deportability but applied for suspension of deportation relief. 4 In evaluating whether petitioner's
thirty-day absence would adversely affect his eligibility for the
relief, the immigration judge purported to apply the test of
Rosenburg v. Fleuti.~ The "Fleuti test", the judge found, is
"three-pronged: the length of the visit, the purposes thereof, and
whether the alien had to receive any travel documents to make
the trip."6 The immigration judge then noted that petitioner travelled several thousand miles, was absent for one month, secured
an I-20A form before departure, carried a Thai passport, and
obtained a new student visa while abroad. Finding that the Fleuti
prerequisites had not been met, the judge concluded that petitioner's one month absence rendered him ineligible for suspension
of deportation relief. 7 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
summarily affirmed the decision. 8
1. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. May, 1979)(per Browning, J.; the other panel members
were Anderson, J. and Waters, D.J.).
2. Form I-20A is a certificate completed by an approved school attesting that the
alien has been accepted by the school and will pursue a full course of studies. It is a
prerequisite for non-immigrant student visas. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (f) (1978).
3. 597 F.2d at 1255.
4. For discussion of suspension of deportation relief see text accompanying notes 11
to 21 infra.
5. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
6. 597 F.2d at 1257.
7.Id.
8. Thf BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision per curiam citing two cases:
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On petition for review, the Ninth Circuit held that the immigration judge and the BIA had based their determinations upon
an erroneous legal standard. The three factors, the court explained, should not be the object of the inquiry. The factors are
merely evidence of the central question of whether an "absence
reduced the significance of the whole seven year period as reflective of hardship and unexpectedness of exposure to expulsion."9
Since the immigration judge and the BIA failed to evaluate petitioner's application in the proper manner, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the case. IO

B.

BACKGROUND: SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION AND THE
CONTINUOUS PRESENCE CLAUSE

Deportation is often considered a harsh and cruel punishment. \I This is particularly true where the alien has lived in this
country for a considerable period of time and has established
significant ties to this society. Recognizing the harshness of deportation, Congress developed measures for relief. '2 One such
measure is suspension of deportation. '3 The Immigration and
Nationality Act 14 provides that the Attorney General may, at his
discretion, suspend the deportation and adjust the status l5 to that
Munor-Casarez v. Immiiration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1975) and In re JanatiAtaie, 14 I. & N. Dec. 216, 221 (Atty. Gen. 1972). In Munoz-Casarez, petitioner's 30-day
visit to an iII sister in Mexico was found to be "meaningfully interruptive" of his residence
ven though petitioner never intended to abandon his residence. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the trip involved an absence of 30 days, was knowing and purposeful, and involved
travelling approximately 1,000 miles. In Janati-Ataie, the Attorney General found petitioner's two visits (one of 30 days, the other of 35 days) to his parents in Iran "meaningfully
interruptive" despite petitioner's intent not to abandon his residence and his substantial
ties to this country. The decision focused upon the duration of the absences, the procurement of travel documents, and the distance travelled.
Later in its opinion, the court, in a footnote, distinguished Munoz-Casarez and in part
disapproved Janati-Ataie. 597 F.2d at 1259 n.7. See note 38 supra.
9. 597 F.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 1260.
11. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)("deportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile").
12. The principle relief provisions are: 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (e) (1976)(voluntary departure); id. § 1251 (f)(waiver of deportation for aliens with family ties who obtained entry
by fraud); id. § 1259 ("registry" which grants permanent residence to certain aliens who
have resided in the United States since 1948); id. § 1253 (h)(withholding deportation to
any country where alien would be subject to persecution); id. § 1255 (adjustment of
status). See generally Mitgang, Alternatives to Deportation: Relief Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 323 (1975).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
14. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
15. Adjustment of status, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976), is a procedure which permits an
alien, already present in the United States in a temporary or irregular status, to apply
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of a permanent resident of any alien who has been "physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less
than seven years, . . . is a person of good moral character . . .
and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, result in extreme hardship . . . . "16
Interpretation of the continuous physical presence clause has
been difficult for the courts. The clause involves two factors:
physical presence and continuity. Although as a factual matter
physical presence is easily determined,17 the determination of
whether a particular departure should be construed as interruptive of an alien's continuous presence in the United States has
been more troublesome. The fact that an alien has taken a brief
trip abroad often bears little rational relation to the ties he has
developed in this country or to the probability that his deportation would cause extreme hardship.
In Wadman v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,18 the
Ninth Circuit faced the construction of the term "continuous" for
the first time. In that case the INS argued that petitioner's five
day trip to Mexico interrupted the continuity of his physical presence even though petitioner had lived in the United States for
over seven years. The court rejected the INS argument and held
that petitioner's absence, when viewed in balance with its consequences, was not meaningfully interruptive of the continuity of
his presence. 19
The Wadman approach was based upon the Supreme Court's
ruling in Rosenburg v. Fleuti. 20 The standard announced in Fleuti
for a permanent residence visa while remaining in the country. Before enactment of §
1255, the alien had to leave the United States, obtain the visa abroad, and return. See
generally 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 7.7 at 7-71
to 7-117 (1979).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a)(1)(1976)(emphasis added).
17. Mere maintenance of residence in the United States is not sufficient. With certain
exceptions for veterans, see 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (b), the alien must have been physically
within the United States borders for the requisite period of time. 2 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, supra note 15, § 7.9d at 7-144 to 7-165.
18. 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
19. [d. at 816.
20. 374 U.S. 449 (1963). The Supreme Court in Fleuti did not deal with the meaning
of "continuous presence" for purposes of suspension of deportation relief but rather with
the meaning of "entry" for purposes of the exclusion and deportation statutes. The Act
defines entry as "any coming of an alien into the United States ... except that an alien
having a lawful permanent. residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making
an entry ... if ... his departure ... was not intended . . . or was not voluntary." 8
U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(13) (1976). The precise definition of "entry" is especially important to
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was whether the alien's departure was intended to be
"meaningfully interruptive" of the alien's residence. The Court
explained that to determine meaningful interruption, factors
such as the length of time of the absence, its purpose, and procruement of travel documents would be relevant. The Court also
indicated that there may exist "other possible relevant factors."21
C.

THE COURT'S REASONING

The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the general nature and purpose of the suspension of deportation provision of the Act. 22 Reaffirming that the principles of Fleuti apply to the provisions of
suspension of deportation relief, the court decided that the section should not be read literally. Because suspension of deportation is a remedial measure, the court concluded that it must be
interpreted generously in light of congressional intent. That intent, found the court, was to "relieve aliens of the harsh results,
and the unsuspected risks and unintended consequences, that
the administration of the exclusion laws since at "entry" aliens are subject to the strict
mandates of the immigration laws regarding admissibility. See generally C. GORDON & H.
RoSENFELD, supra note 15, § 2.32 at 2-251 to 2-254.
The "re-entry doctrine," provides that an alien's return following a temporary absence abroad will be deemed a new entry for purposes of the immigration laws. Volpe v.
Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933). As a result, a long-time permanent resident who leaves
the country is subject to the strict entry requirements each and every time a "new entry"
is made. Because the admission laws are often more encompassing or more difficult to
satisfy than the deportation laws (compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (grounds for exclusion) with
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (grounds for deportation)), the resident alien returning from a trip
abroad may be excluded or deported even though he could not have been had he remained
in the country. The irrationality of predicating an alien's right to remain here upon travel
abroad led the Supreme Court to reconsider the literal interpretation of the entry definition in Fleuti.
The Fleuti Court focused upon the intent exception to the Act's definition of entry.
Reasoning that Congress intended to protect resident aliens from "unsuspected risks and
unintended consequences of ... wholly innocent action," 374 U.S. at 462, the Court
construed the exception to mean an intent to "meaningfully interrupt" the alien's residence. [d.
Although Fleuti dealt with re-entry while Wadman involved "continuous presence,"
the Wadman court found the distinction "not ... at all significant." 329 F.2d at 815. In
both areas, the inquiry focused on the circumstances under which an alien's absence
should affect his deportability. [d. at 814.
For a discussion of the history and impact of the "re-entry doctrine" see generally
Gordon, When Does an Alien Enter the United States?, 9 FED. B.J. 248 (1948). For a
critique of the doctrine see Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Laws: Proposals for
Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327 (1956); see also Herron, Exclusion and Deportation
of Resident Aliens: The Re-entry Doctrine and the Need for Reform, 13 SAN. DIEGO L. REV.
192 (1975).
21. 374 U.S. at 462.
22. The court also reviewed the purpose of the entry section of the Act as identified
in Fleuti. See note 20 supra.
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would flow from a literal and rigid application of the provisions
of the Act relating to expulsion and exclusion."23
The court then turned to the specific function of the continuous physical presence requirement. According to the court, Congress judged that seven years of physical presence would give rise
to the likelihood of ties to this society sufficient to justify an
examination by the Attorney General into whether deportation
would be unduly harsh. The requirement of continuity was included because it "is important to the legitimacy of the inference
that extended presence is likely to make deportation harsh."24
The court noted that frequent and long absences abroad suggest
that the alien has not become attached to this society. Conversely, however, brief and infrequent absences would not diminish the probability of attachment. "An alien who leaves the country briefly. . . may be in no different position realistically viewed
alien who has remained within the borders for an identical period. "25
To realize Congress' desire to avoid exposing aliens to unexpected risks of wholly innocent action, as identified by Fleuti,28
and to realize the purpose of the "continuous period" requirement, the court held that the BIA must determine "whether a
particular absence during the seven-year period reduced the significance of the whole period as reflective of the hardship and
unexpectedness of expulsion."27 As illustrative of this new standard the court explained that:
An absence cannot be significant or meaningfully
interruptive of the whole period if indications are
that the hardship of deportation to the alien
would be equally severe had the absence not occurred, and that no significant increase in the likelihood of deportation could reasonably have
been expected to flow from the manner and circumstances surrounding the absence.28.

The court found that the immigration judge and the BIA
failed to evaluate petitioner's absence in this manner. Instead,
23. 597 F.2d at 1256.
24. [d.
25. [d. at 1257.
26. See note 20 supra.
27. 597 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis added).
28. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/11

14

1980]

Schmid: Immigration Law
IMMIGRATION
LAW

309

the immigration judge focused solely on the three factors identified in Fleuti and proceeded to apply them as if they were themselves determinative of the meaning of the "continuous period"
requirement. The court pointed out that these factors are not the
object of inquiry, but merely evidentiary of the primary issue of
whether the absence reduced the hardship or unexpectedness of
expulsion. 29 The court concluded that to treat the factors "as if
they were in themselves the object of inquiry may defeat the
objectives of the statute."30
In light of the new standard, the court reviewed the facts of
petitioner's thirty-day absence. The court noted two prior
decisions which indicated that neither an absence of six 31 nor
sixteen months32 would, 'as a matter of law, conclusively interrupt
the continuity of physical presence. Although petitioner was absent for thirty days and travelled several thousand miles, the
court found that the trip was temporary by design,33 his only
absence from the country, and limited in duration and distance
by the exigencies that produced it. 34 On balance, the court found
that petitioner had significant ties to this country since he had
been lawfully present in the United States for over twelve years
and, during this period, had completed his education and pursued his chosen profession. The court thus concluded that
"[n]othing in the circumstances of petitioner's 30-day trip to
Thailand detracts in any way from the inference, otherwise appropriate from the length and nature of . . . his presence, that
expulsion would be unexpected and would entail great hardship. "35
29. The court noted that the alien's purpose for the trip may have significance inde·
pendent of its relevance in determining the importance of the absence in light of harshness
and unexpectedness of deportation. Following the Fleuti interpretation, 374 U.S. at 642,
the court held that if the purpose of the trip contravened some policy reflected in the
immigration laws, the trip might be meaningfully interruptive. 597 F.2d at 1257-58 n.5.
Considerable confusion has arisen in the application of the "purpose factor". See Herron,
supra note 20, at 204.
30. 597 F.2d at 1257-58.
31. Toon·Ming Wong v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 363 F.2d 234,236 (9th Cir. 1966).
32. McLeod v. Peterson, 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960). However, McLeod, a pre.Fleuti
case, was decided on estoppel principles since petitioner's absence was caused by the
wrongful conduct of the INS.
33. The trip was taken during a semester break. Petitioner left when classes ended
and returned when they resumed. 597 F.2d at 1258.
34. Petitioner went to Thailand to visit his mother who was gravely ill. Id. at 1255.
35. [d. at 1258.
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Similarly, the fact that petitioner secured travel documents
was not dispositive. The court explained that procurement of
documents is relevant in two ways: on the one hand, it may
undermine the alien's continuous presence by showing the alien's
awareness of the immigration consequences of his trip;38 on the
other hand, it may confirm the continuity of his presence by
showing his determination that the trip not affect his right to
remain in this country. 37 Contrary to the holding of the immigration judge, the court found that the steps petitioner took to obtajn
the documents and the nature of the documents he obtained confirmed the continuity of his presence since it demonstrated that
he was "determined that his trip should not affect his status in
this country. "38
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the only determination consistent with the statutory purpose was that petitioner's absence did not break the continuity of his twelve-year
physical presence. However, since the immigration judge and the
BIA had based their contrary decisions upon an erroneous legal
standard, the court properly remanded the case for a determination based upon the correct standard. 3D
D.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD

Before Kamheangpatiyooth, considerable confusion had arisen in the judicial and administrative efforts to apply the Fleuti
standard. 40 This standard, whether the alien's absence is
36. The Fleuti court explained that procurement of travel documents was relevant
because "the need to obtain such items might well cause the alien to consider more fully
the implications involved in his leaving the country." 374 U.S. at 462. Presumably the
alien's knowledge, in turn, would be relevant to the determination of unexpectedness of
deportation.
37. 597 F.2d at 1259. The court relied on Itzcovitz v. Selective Service, 447 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1971). In that case the alien sought and obtained a declaratory judgement that
an expected business trip to Israel would not affect his status.
38. The court further noted that although petitioner in Kamheangpatiyooth, unlike
ltzcovitz, did not seek a judicial determination before his trip, his procurement of return
travel documents demonstrated with equal clarity his "determination" that the trip not
affect his status. 597 F .2d at 1259.
In a footnote to the discussion of travel documents, the court also discussed the two
decisions relied on by the BIA. [d. at 1259 n. 7. The court distinguished Munoz-Casarez
on the grounds that, unlike Kamheangpatiyooth, there was no "affirmative demonstration" of unexpectedness of deportation since it was not evident whether the alien in that
case secured travel documents. The court disapproved in part Janati-Ataie, finding that
the alien in that case did demonstrate adequate "pre-absence affirmative action." [d.
39. [d. at 1259-60.
40. For an excellent discussion of the post-Fleuti decisions see Herron, supra note 20,
at 200-06.
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"meaningfully interruptive" of his residence, is conclusionary
and thus provides little guidance for rational determinations in
specific situations. As a result, some decisions narrowly focused
upon the factors suggested by the Supreme Court, treating the
factors themselves as the test or standard of "meaningful interruption."41 Many decisions, on the other hand, developed and
relied upon "other relevant factors."42 Lack of focus regarding
what the "other factors" were relevant to, however, has led to
disagreement over what factors should or should not be considered,43
The Ninth Circuit's approach represents a significant departure from this past confusion. By defining "meaningful interruption" in terms of whether an absence reduces the hardship and
unexpectedness of deportation, the court provides guidance for
future determinations. By rejecting the rigid application of the
Fleuti factors, the court redirects the determination to effectuate
the remedial purpose of suspension of deportation relief.
The decision may be subject to charges of judicial legislation
since the Ninth Circuit appears to have taken abundant liberties
with the otherwise clear and plain meaning of the term
"continuous." Nevertheless, the court's "liberal construction" of
the continuous presence clause seems justifiable since it is firmly
grounded in the principles set forth by the Fleuti Court. This
holding simply reflects an extension of prior judicial efforts to
ameliorate the harsh consequences of literal application of our
often out-dated H immigration laws. Moreover, the decision does
not contravene Congress' overall purpose for the statute. As the
41. See, e.g., Munoz-Casarez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947 (9th Cir.
1975); In re Janati-Ataie, 141. & N. Dec. 216, 222-25 (Atty. Gen. 1972); In re Guimaraes,
10 I. & N. Dec. 529 (1964).
42. See, e.g., Heitland v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 551 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 1977)
(illegality of original entry is a relevant factor); Lozano-Giron v. Immigration & Nat.
Serv., 506 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1974) (alien's ties to this country and nature of
environment to which he would be deported is relevant); Toon-Ming Wong v. Immigration
& Nat. Serv., 363 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1966) (petitioner's minority considered a factor);
Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965)
(subjective intent of alien not to abandon domicile is relevant).
43. Compare Heitland v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 551 F.2d 495,502 (2d Cir. 1977)
(illegality of original entry relevant), with Git Foo Wong v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 358
F.2d'151, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1966) (illegality of original entry irrelevant); and compare
Munoz-Casarez v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 511 F.2d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 1975) (subjective
intent of alien not the test) with Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 339 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965) (subjective intent a relevant factor).
44. See Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1 (1975-1976); see also Maslow, supra note 20.
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court explained, the new standard will not require the granting
of relief in unmeritorious cases; once eligibility is determined, it
is still up to the Attorney General to review the case and to decide
whether, in his or her discretion, relief in fact would be warranted. 45
It is not clear from the decision how great a reduction in the
harshness or unexpectedness of deportation an absence must
cause before the court will find meaningful interruption. The decision simply indicates that the reduction must be "significant."46
Since the term is not precisely defined, it is difficult to predict
how the court will rule in future cases where the facts differ significantly from those in Kamheangpatiyooth.
Equally unclear from the decision is how the determination
of "unexpectedness" will be made. During its discussion of the
significance of securing travel documents, the court implied that
deportation would be unexpected where the alien lacked awareness that his departure could adversely affect his immigration
status. 47 However, the court also indicated that an alien's own
determination that his trip not affect his status would show
"unexpectedness."48 As a result it remains uncertain which definition the court will use in future applications of the standard.
An alien may be "determined" to retain his status while at the
same time fully "aware" of the immigration consequences of his
departure.
The Kamheangpatiyooth decision is an important case for
the immigration practitioner. It greatly expands the boundary of
permissible argument in suspension of deportation cases}9 No
45. The statute emphasizes that the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend
deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976). Consequently, even if the applicant meets the
statutory requirements, he must still appeal to the discretion of the Attorney General,
exercised through his delegates (ultimately the BIA). There are no published guidelines
for the exercise of this discretion. See generally C. GORDON & H. RoSENFELD supra note
15, § 7.ge at 7-165 to 7-170. If the Attorney General does not grant relief, the applicant
must show an abuse of discretion. [d. § 8.15c at 8-99 to 8-105.
46. 597 F.2d at 1259.
47. See the court's discussion of the relevance of petitioner's procurement of travel
documents. [d. at 1259; see also notes 36 to 38 supra and accompanying text.
48. 597 F.2d at 1259.
49. The present dEtcision may also be persuasive authority in cases involving the reentry doctrine. See note 20 supra. The court relied heavily upon Fleuti in developing its
standard and reaffirmed that the principles of Fleuti used "in deciding whether an entry
was intentional ... should also guide the determination of whether an intervening absence interrupts the continuity of physical presence . . ." 597 F .2d at 1256.
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longer should the fulfillment of the three Fleuti factors be the sole
or primary objects of the inquiry. The new standard invites all
evidence relevant to the significance of the absence. As the standard suggests, particularly important will be the harshness and
unexpectedness of deportation. Although even before
Kamheangpatiyooth some courts considered harshness and unexpectedness as factors in their determinations,50 the new standard
elevates these elements to the focus of the inquiry. In this light,
the practitioner should concentrate his or her argument upon
these two elements with the aim of showing that their significance
was not meaningfully reduced by the alien's absence. One should
emphasize such factors as the length of the alien's residence in
relation to the brevity of his absence, the preservation of economic and emotional ties to this society, the intent of the alien
not to abandon his residence, and the alien's determination that
his absence not affect his immigration status.

E.

CONCLUSION

Like many legal standards, the Ninth Circuit's new approach does not provide a simple mathematical formula for predicting the results of its application to different fact situations.
Future decisions, however, should serve to further delineate the
specific parameters of the standard and thus alleviate much of
the remaining confusion surrounding the continuous presence
clause. For the alien applying for suspension of deportation relief,
the new standard represents a step forward in the removal of an
irrational barrier. Although the standard makes no guarantees
that the alien's application will be approved, it increases the
chances of consideration on the merits instead of dismissal based
on an inflexible requirement.
Alex Schmid
50. See, e.g., Lozano-Giron v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 506 F.2d 1073,1077-78 (7th
Cir. 1974).
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